Showing posts with label Euro Crash: The Implications of Monetary Failure in Europe. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Euro Crash: The Implications of Monetary Failure in Europe. Show all posts

Monday, February 11, 2019

The Warnings of Professor von Mises Carried No Weight in the European Central Bank (ECB) Council: "There Is Not, and There Cannot Be, such a Thing as Quantitative Economics!"

The Deutsche Bundesbank, now under the presidency of a renowned econometrics professor (Axel Weber), seemed to be putting more emphasis than ever before on the output of the models. Otmar Issing, the eminence grise in the ECB at the start, and to a moderate degree sceptical of econometrics according to his autobiographic account (see Issing, 2008), had retired in autumn 2006.

The warnings of Professor von Mises (1971) carried no weight in the ECB Council:
There is not, and there cannot be, such a thing as quantitative economics. The usual method employed in business forecasts is statistical and thereby retrospective. They depict trends that prevailed in the past and are familiar to everybody. They in no way answer the questions that all people, and especially businessmen, are asking. People know that trends can change; they are afraid they will change; and they would like to know when the change will occur. But the statistician knows only what everybody knows, namely, that they have not changed!
The data which was being fed into the econometrics model on which the ECB prided itself, supplemented by the ECB’s analysis of the ‘second pillar’ of its monetary framework, did not produce any hint of serious recession risk ahead. Instead it was the amber or even red inflation light which was blinking! 

--Brendan Brown, Euro Crash: The Implications of Monetary Failure in Europe (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 95-96.


Saturday, January 26, 2019

Much of the Austrian School Critique of Monetary Policy in the 1920s Could Be Replicated Against the Greenspan-Bernanke Federal Reserve

Yet there are echoes of the earlier monetary catastrophe in the present-day monetary tumult (or catastrophe?) which are eerie and troubling for those who believe strongly in human progress. Here was a renowned professor in monetary economics at the head of the Federal Reserve, who on the occasion of Milton Friedman’s ninetieth birthday party had said that the monetary mistakes which surrounded the Great Depression would never be made again. There were grounds to question whether the professor had learnt the wrong lessons.

The professor (Ben Bernanke) had been the key proponent (back in 2003 already) of the expansionary policy (breathing in inflation) which had played such a critical role in generating the bubble in the first place (even if the buck ultimately stopped at Alan Greenspan’s desk). Indeed, much of the ‘neo-Austrian’ critique (see Rothbard, 1972) of US monetary policy in the 1920s under the leadership of New York Federal Reserve Governor Benjamin Strong in the 1920s could be replicated against the Greenspan–Bernanke Federal Reserve.

At a time when real forces (productivity surge due to technological revolution and terms of trade improvement) were putting downward pressure on the equilibrium level of goods and services prices, the Federal Reserve was setting monetary conditions such as to produce a stable or gently rising price level. In doing so the Federal Reserve created grave monetary disequilibrium with its main symptom being a sharp rise of temperature in credit and asset markets.

--Brendan Brown, Euro Crash: The Implications of Monetary Failure in Europe (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 83.