Locke, Jefferson, and Others Never Tired of Pointing out that Tyrannical Rulers, Not Those Who Resist Them, Are the True Rebels

The right of resistance therefore functions as a kind of safety valve, alerting rulers that they are overstepping their legitimate boundaries. If this right is denied, if the abuse of power is allowed to grow unchecked until it becomes tyrannical, then no remedy will be available except a complete revolution. The right of resistance provides citizens with another option. By resisting unjust laws before the onset of total tyranny, we may be able to reverse the growth of power, thereby avoiding tyranny – and the need for revolution.

This is more or less how John Locke viewed this issue. The “state of Mankind is not so miserable that they are not capable of using this Remedy, till it be too late to look for any.” It does no good to tell people that “they may expect Relief, when it is too late, and the evil is past Cure.” Locke continues:

This is in effect no more than to bid them first be Slaves, and then to take care of their Liberty; and when their Chains are on, tell them, they may act like Freemen. This, if barely so, is rather Mockery than Relief; and Men can never be secure from Tyranny, if there be no means to escape it, till they are perfectly under it: And therefore it is that they have not only a Right to get out of it, but to prevent it.

The classic objection to the right of resistance – that it will undercut the authority of all law – was answered by pointing out that law can retain its authority only so long as it is generally regarded as just. When a government enacts and enforces unjust laws, it rebels against the principles of natural right and undercuts its own authority. Locke, Jefferson, and others never tired of pointing out that tyrannical rulers, not those who resist them, are the true rebels. As Locke put it, “For Rebellion being an Opposition, not to Persons, but Authority, which is founded only in the Constitutions and Laws of the Government; those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force justify their violation of them, are truly and properly Rebels.”

The ruler must obey the same laws that are constitutionally prescribed for everyone else. Thus, whenever a ruler exceeds his or her constitutional limits, it is that ruler who rebels against the legal order and undermines legitimate authority. The right of resistance, therefore, is essential for preserving the authority of law, because it demands that everyone must abide by it, including those in power.

--George H. Smith, The System of Liberty: Themes in the History of Classical Liberalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), e-book.

Inalienable Rights Could Never Have Been Transferred to Government in a Social Contract, So No Government Can Properly Claim Jurisdiction Over Them

Let us now consider Jefferson's mention of “unalienable rights.” Unalienable (or “inalienable”) rights stood in contrast to alienable rights, so we might wonder why Jefferson found it necessary to refer to this rather technical distinction, especially in a political document that was intended for popular consumption. Why didn't Jefferson simply speak of “rights” in general, instead of focusing on inalienable rights?

Inalienable rights were regarded as fundamental corollaries of a person's essential nature, especially his or her reason and volition, so these rights could never be surrendered or transferred to another person (including a government), even with the agent's consent. People can no more transfer their inalienable rights than they can transfer their moral agency, their ability to reason, and so forth. This means that inalienable rights could never have been transferred to government in a social contract, so no government can properly claim jurisdiction over them. Consequently, any government that systematically violates inalienable rights is necessarily tyrannical and vulnerable to revolution. As Francis Hutcheson put it, “Unalienable Rights are essential Limitations to all Governments.”

According to this theory, legitimate disagreements may occur between subjects and rulers when alienable rights are involved, but no such disputes are possible between people of good will when inalienable rights are involved. No government can claim jurisdiction over inalienable rights, because they are incapable of alienation and so could never have been delegated or surrendered to a government in the first place. This means there can be no excuse for the systematic violation of inalienable rights. This is the bright-line test that enables us to distinguish the incidental or well-intentioned violation of rights, which even just governments may occasionally commit, from the deliberate and inexcusable violations of a tyrannical government.

This is why Jefferson focused on inalienable rights in his effort to fasten the charge of tyranny on the British government. The violation of inalienable rights was a defining characteristic of a tyrannical government, and only against such a government is revolution clearly justified.

--George H. Smith, The System of Liberty: Themes in the History of Classical Liberalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), e-book.

Spencer Saw the NEW Liberalism As Paternalism; It Called for State Intervention in Voluntary Relationships on the Grounds that the State Has the Parental-Like Duty to Protect Individuals from Their Own Decisions

Old liberals – or what Spencer preferred to call “true” liberals – disliked the implication of the modifier “new,” which suggested something progressive, as if new liberals had improved on the theory of old liberalism while retaining what was worthwhile and discarding what had become obsolete. The term “liberal” carried favorable connotations; in addition to its association with “liberty” (“liberal” derives from liber, the Latin word for “free”), the adjectival form had long been used to mean magnanimous, open-minded, and tolerant. The label therefore suggested something more than a political doctrine; it suggested a humanistic outlook, a moral and social ideology in which the happiness of the individual is a key concern.

Given these implications, it is understandable why many social reformers who disliked the laissez- faire tendencies of traditional liberalism did not wish to jettison the label. They claimed that the new liberalism was based on a more sophisticated notion of freedom and therefore represented intellectual progress. As Spencer viewed the matter, though, the new liberalism was essentially old wine in a new bottle. The old wine in this case was paternalism, a doctrine that called for state intervention in voluntary relationships on the grounds that the state has the parental-like duty to protect individuals from the potentially harmful effects of their own uncoerced decisions and actions.

--George H. Smith, The System of Liberty: Themes in the History of Classical Liberalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), e-book.