Unsatisfied with the course of political events, a group of economists, joined by a former professor of law at the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider, have questioned the legitimacy of the bailout in front of the German Federal [Constitutional] Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht. These individuals had already fought and lost one case against the German adoption of the Euro in 1998. This time, however, they insisted on their position that the Greek bailout would turn the ‘European Union into an inflationary union.’ Indeed, financial aid to Greece seems to constitute a breach of European Law. Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union clearly states that the Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments of any member state. Guarantees by the member states for Greek bonds constitute a breach of that rule.
Even ignoring the more explicit bailouts, a tacit bailout was already undertaken in recent years. As Bagus (2010) points out, the ECB has long accepted Greek bonds as collateral for new loans. Since the interest rate at which banks borrow money from the central bank is lower than the interest received from the government bonds, demand for Greek bonds was induced. Had the ECB not accepted Greek bonds as collateral, Greece would have had to pay even higher interest rates than they did. Hence, Greece and other troubled states were already being bailed out by the rest of the Eurozone before the sovereign debt crisis even emerged, as their debt was effectively monetized. In November 2010, every second Euro that the ECB lent to banks went to the ‘financially weak countries.’
—Malte Tobias Kähler, “From German Rules to European Discretion: Policy's Slippery Slope,” in Institutions in Crisis: European Perspectives on the Recession, ed. David Howden (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 170-171.
Showing posts with label Institutions in Crisis: European Perspectives on the Recession. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Institutions in Crisis: European Perspectives on the Recession. Show all posts
Sunday, November 17, 2019
Thursday, November 29, 2018
The Farm Lobby in Germany Had Held the Country Captive Since the Tariff-Wall Days of Otto von Bismarck
Polls suggest that people agree with the statement that farm subsidies are necessary to guarantee a secure food supply; economists, on the other hand, see farm subsidies as wasteful and unnecessary for these ends. He then asks, 'Why are economists not listened to?' One might think that people just have not thought about it, but even when explained well, economists' analyses are not persuasive or interesting to many people. Thus, consumers become increasingly 'rationally ignorant' that they are paying elevated prices for their food -- it is not worth the effort of becoming informed, protesting or caring.
Blame is normally laid at the feet of the French for the CAP [the Common Agricultural Policy]. Many see Germany as being the poor soul that was dragged into accepting the CAP as the price for a free market in industrial goods. It should be noted, however, that German agriculture opposed the policy even more so because it feared the CAP would reduce its protections, which were the highest in Europe at the time. The farm lobby in Germany had held the country captive since the tariff-wall days of Otto von Bismarck. With the highest support prices in the EEC, Germany feared that harmonization would bring painful price cuts for its politically influential arable farmers.
--Brian Ó Caithnia, "Compounding Agricultural Poverty: How the EU's Common Agricultural Policy Is Strangling European Recovery," in Institutions in Crisis: European Perspectives on the Recession, ed. David Howden, New Thinking in Political Economy (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 202.
Blame is normally laid at the feet of the French for the CAP [the Common Agricultural Policy]. Many see Germany as being the poor soul that was dragged into accepting the CAP as the price for a free market in industrial goods. It should be noted, however, that German agriculture opposed the policy even more so because it feared the CAP would reduce its protections, which were the highest in Europe at the time. The farm lobby in Germany had held the country captive since the tariff-wall days of Otto von Bismarck. With the highest support prices in the EEC, Germany feared that harmonization would bring painful price cuts for its politically influential arable farmers.
--Brian Ó Caithnia, "Compounding Agricultural Poverty: How the EU's Common Agricultural Policy Is Strangling European Recovery," in Institutions in Crisis: European Perspectives on the Recession, ed. David Howden, New Thinking in Political Economy (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011), 202.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)

