The period from 1873 to 1896 bothered economic historians for decades. Both people living at the time, and many later academics, branded it a time of unprecedented economic stagnation throughout the gold-standard nations. In Britain (supposedly the hardest hit), 'there was an overwhelming mass of opinion -- in reports of parliamentary committees and royal commissions, in parliamentary debates, newspapers, books, pamphlets, and speeches -- that conditions were bad'.
The popular impression was supported by a single, indisputable fact: Britain and most of the West had witnessed a 'uniquely persistent deflation' with the British wholesale price index losing close to one-third of its value in less than a quarter-century. For many this 'most drastic deflation in the memory of man' was both evidence and cause of what Josiah Stamp called 'a chronic depression in trade'.
The decades-long decline in prices has been termed 'the essential problem of the Great Depression'. In what sense was it a problem? Basically, because the popular linking of deflation with depression was contradicted by all sorts of other evidence. As early as 1877 Robert Giffen found himself countering the 'common impression' that a depression of unprecedented severity was in progress. 'The common impression', Giffen insisted, 'is wrong, and the facts are entirely the other way.'
--George A. Selgin, Less Than Zero: The Case for a Falling Price Level in a Growing Economy, Hobart Paper 132 (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1997), 49-50.
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