This Upside-Down Economics Was Made Possible by What Is Euphemistically Called "Managed Money"

At present [1959], the purchasing power of the French franc is less than one-two-hundredth, about 0.4 per cent, of what it was in 1914. . . .

This French monetary-fiscal debacle was brought about by the process of printing paper money in order to pay for the deficit the government was running in 38 out of 44 years--or rather, for the part of the deficits that could not be covered by pushing the bonds down the throats of the public and of the savings institutions. . . .

Only a dictator could force monetary and fiscal discipline upon a public almost every sector of which was determined to milk to Welfare State for its own private benefit.

And there was always a convenient excuse available for not going to the root of the trouble: first the need for reconstruction; then the Indo-China war; the cost of the Algerian rebellion since 1954 which, in reality, accounts for scarcely more than 10 per cent of the total of governmental expenditures. (The Indo-China war was paid for largely by the United States taxpayer.) The truth is, as a French economist, Dr. Jacques Rueff, summed it up, that the French were consuming more than producing, investing more than saving, importing more than exporting, and hiding a good portion of their profits in gold at home or in assets abroad. This upside-down economics was made possible by what is euphemistically called "Managed Money."

--Melchior Palyi, A Lesson in French Inflation (New York: Economists' National Committee on Monetary Policy, 1959), 12-13.