In September 2007, Northern Rock Triggering the First High Street Bank Run in the UK Since 1866

The British bank Northern Rock played a starring role in the unfolding drama of the financial crisis. In September 2007, news that Northern Rock had used emergency liquidity support from the Bank of England led to the first high street bank run in the United Kingdom since Overend, Gurney and Co. in 1866. Following unsuccessful attempts at finding a private-sector buyer, Northern Rock was nationalized in February 2008, a policy outcome that would have struck many people as unthinkable just a few months before. Indeed, the speed at which “the Rock” had gone from being the darling of the city to a symbol of the meltdown was breathtaking. Following its listing on the FTSE 100 in 2000, the share price had been steadily increasing, and the company posted profits of more than £440 million in 2006. Around 5 percent of annual profit was being paid into the Northern Rock Foundation, which grew to be one of the United Kingdom’s largest corporation foundations (giving grants of more than £27 million in 2006), and the company had emerged as a beacon of North East economic renewal through its sponsorship of local sports teams and the planned development of new headquarters. If loyal customers were surprised at the speed of the bank’s downfall, they weren’t alone.

The main problem with Northern Rock’s business model was that its rapid expansion entailed two things: (1) allowing mortgage products to constitute a high proportion of its assets (about 75 percent) and (2) funding this through wholesale markets. [Note that unlike the situation facing many US banks, it wasn’t an increase in defaults on mortgage payments that got Northern Rock into trouble but the freezing up of funding.]  In hindsight, the errors seem obvious, but the board was so oblivious that it planned a 30-percent increase in dividends as late as July 2007. And yet just two months after making a voluntary choice to reduce capital, it required emergency liquidity provisions. When questioned about this decision, Adam Applegarth (then CEO) pointed out that it wasn’t only the board that failed to anticipate the problem; the company had been focused on compliance with the Basel II international standards, working alongside the Financial Services Authority (FSA). Indeed, regulators deserve blame for two elements of this. First, the regulations themselves encouraged aspects of the problem: “Mortgage products had been made so attractive by IRB [internal-ratings-based] adherence to Basel II, that there was an incentive to grow them more quickly than could be funded by depositors.” There is little reason to think that stoking a housing bubble was an aim of Basel II, suggesting that it was an unintended consequence, that the Basel committee was simply ignorant of the activity that it was encouraging. The second failure of regulators was in not identifying the problems after they had begun to emerge. In June 2007, the FSA had approved the approach taken by Northern Rock to satisfy Basel II, partly because “they had Tier 1 capital of a ‘healthy’ 11.3 per cent of RAW [risk-weighted assets].” Despite retrospective protestations, the FSA was hardly trying to rein in a reckless company.


—Anthony J. Evans, “The Financial Crisis in the United Kingdom: Uncertainty, Calculation, and Error,” in The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics, ed. Peter J. Boettke and Christopher J. Coyne (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 749-750.